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Abstract 
Since 2011, the private ride-hailing companies Uber and Lyft have expanded into more and more US 
cities. We use regression discontinuity design to examine the impact of Uber and Lyft’s entry on public 
transportation use in the US’ largest urban areas. In most cases, entry into cities by the two ride-hailing 
companies was staggered: Uber entered first followed some months later by Lyft. We find that public 
transportation use increased in an urban area, all else equal, immediately following the first entry. 
However, we find that the spike in public transportation use after first entry disappeared following the 
entry of the second company. In fact there is some evidence that monthly public transportation 
ridership levels fell below their pre-first entry levels. In other words, the joint presence of the two 
major private ride-hailing services transformed ride-hailing services from a public transportation 
complement to a public transportation substitute, at least in the studied urban areas. We speculate 
that the first entrant complemented public transportation use for some in an urban area by solving the 
“last-mile” problem and by providing a potentially safer option at night when public transportation 
service has been reduced. However, we speculate the second entrant is likely to have spurred price 
competition in the urban area’s ride-hailing duopoly market and an increase in ride-hailing car supply. 
This competitive effect could have tipped the scales, making an entire trip with a ride-hailing service 





In early 2017, New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority announced that annual New 
York subway ridership fell in 2016 compared to 2015, the first annual dip since 2009. Although 
weekday subway ridership was at its highest level since 1948, the 3% dip in weekend ridership 
between 2015 and 2016 led to the net decline in subway use. The authority stated that several factors 
could have contributed to the decline: “rising subway delays, the popularity of Uber and other apps, 
and weekend maintenance work that disrupt[ed] service” (emphasis ours) (Fitzsimmons 2017).1 
That private ride-hailing services like Uber and Lyft would be an appealing substitute for public 
transit is an intuitive notion, especially when public transit stops are several blocks away, buses or 
trains come infrequently, and public transit may be unsafe or unclean. At the touch of a button on a 
smartphone, a traveler can procure reliable, relatively private, and safe2 door-to-door transit within 
minutes. Better yet, the price of the Uber or Lyft ride may only be $5 or $10 more than a less 
                                                
1
 Curiously, a full year of low gasoline prices was not mentioned as a potential reason for more car-bound weekend trips. 
2
 Whether using Uber and Lyft is actually safer than public transportation, especially for women, is an open question. For 
example, the website http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents catalogs passenger deaths, assaults, 
kidnappings, and endangerment at the hands of ride-hailing company drivers.   
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comfortable and less convenient bus or subway ride.3,4  For example, Schwieterman and Michel (2016) 
compared the price and speed of fifty trips in the Chicago area. Each trip was started at the same time 
by two people but one person used UberPool, Uber’s carpooling service where a passenger can expect 
to share their trip with one or two other people, and the other used Chicago’s public transit system, 
either a bus or subway line. The average time for an UberPool trip was 35:52 minutes and the average 
time for the same trip on public transportation was 48:29 minutes. The average cost of the UberPool 
trip was $9.66 and the average cost of the public transit trip was $2.29.5 
However, there is an alternative narrative that, rather than depressing public transit use, ride-
hailing services boost (complement) public transit use, all else equal.  In this narrative, Uber and Lyft 
are conveyances that lower public transportation’s access and egress time. For example, Uber and Lyft 
increase the likelihood of using public transportation as the primary mode of transportation by solving 
the “last mile” problem (Wang and Odoni 2016). The “last mile” problem refers to the difficulty in 
getting people from a public transportation stop or station to their final destination, whether it is their 
home, work, a store, or entertainment. In fact, a report from Uber highlighted their product as a 
solution to the “last mile” problem by offering “residents of areas underserved by public transit a 
reliable and fast link to public transportation, effectively expanding the coverage of existing transit 
networks” (p. 27, Uber 2015).  
As far as we can tell, there is no publicly available research on the ways that ride-hailing 
services substitute and complement public transportation use in major cities across the US.6 For 
example, it appears the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s statement on the impact of 
ride-hailing companies on public transportation use in New York is speculative; the statement does not 
appear to be based on any rigorous data analysis.   
Here we provide some information on the relationship between ride-hailing services and public 
transit use in major US urban areas. Our aim is to determine if public transportation and ride-hailing 
services are substitutes or complements for each other or if they have a more complex relationship. To 
do this we use a discontinuity regression design to measure the effect of private ride-hailing service 
entry on total public transportation use in the US’ largest urban areas. We find that, on average, 
monthly public transportation use in urban areas increased immediately following the entry of the first 
private ride-hailing service. However, we find the entry of the second ride-hailing company, typically 
                                                
3
 While researchers have collected snatches of data that Uber and Lyft charge for a ride, including surge prices, the 
companies do not provide comprehensive datasets on their prices. For example, Cohen et al. (2016) were provided a 
database of 50 million individual-level interactions with Uber’s app. For each interaction the researchers are given the price 
the app users saw, but only in relative terms. The numeraire price was never reported.      
4
 Whether Uber can continue to offer low prices is debatable. Based on private financial statements that Uber shared with 
investors and that were published in the financial press, Hubert Horan found that “Uber passengers were paying only 41% 




 Given these statistics a person who chooses UberPool over public transportation is willing to pay at least $7.37 on some 
combination of saving 12 minutes and 38 seconds on commute time in a cleaner, more private mode of transportation. This 
translates to $35.00 per hour. The US Department of Transportation reported that the average US consumer is willing to 
pay $24.00 to save an hour of commute time 
(https://cms.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/USDOT%20VOT%20Guidance%202014.pdf).  
6
 See Kelley (2016) for analysis on the impact of ride-hailing services on taxi-cab use. 
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Lyft, several months later erased the spike in public transportation use seen immediately after first 
entry, all else equal.  We repeat our analysis only using public transportation trips made by rail (e.g., 
light rail and commuter rail) and then again only using public transportation trips made by bus. While 
the incremental impact of first and second entry on rail use is similar to our overall results, there is 
some evidence that bus use and ride-hailing services remained complementary even after the entry of 
the second company. Overall, our analysis shows that public transportation use and ride-hailing 
services can be complementary initially, but the subsequent duopolistic competition between Uber 
and Lyft tends to reverse any preliminary complementarities.      
 
2. Theory 
Consider an individual who can either drive her own car (C), use public transportation (PT), or a 
hail a ride (RS) to get to her destination.7 This individual j has preferences over consumption of a 
composite good, Xj, and a generalized transportation cost, Tj. We assume individual j has a quasilinear 
utility function of the form, 
 
( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), )j j j j j j j j j j jU X T s PT RS a PT RS w PT RS m= −      (1) 
 
where transportation cost is a function of transportation speed sj (e.g., miles per hour), access and 
egress time aj, waiting time wj, and trip distance m (Anderson 2014). PTj and RSj are j’s transportation 
mode choice variables. Let 1jPT =  if individual j chooses to travel to her destination by PT and equals 
0 otherwise. Let 1jRS =  if individual j chooses to travel to her destination with a hailed ride and equals 
0 otherwise. PTj and RSj can both be equal to 0 (she uses her car to get to her destination) but they 
both cannot be equal to 1 (she cannot both use PT and a ride hailing service). In other words, we 
assume no multi-modal trips.8  
Individual j maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint, 
 
( ) ( )( )1 1j j PT j j RS j C jY X m p PT PT p RS p RS = + + − + −       (2) 
 
where income Yj must equal spending on the composite good X (whose price is normalized 
to unity) plus trip costs (Anderson 2014). Let pPT, pRS, and pC measure the per distance unit of travel 
price when using PT, RS, and a car, respectively. 
 Let us convert ( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), )j j j j j j j j jT s PT RS a PT RS w PT RS m from (1) into a dollar value, just like 
Xj. Let j value time at vi dollars per hour. Small and Verhoef (2007), Abrantes and Wardman (2011), and 
others have found that people place a higher value on time spent waiting for transit (in our case given 
by w), stuck in traffic, or walking (or more generally, egress time a) than they do on the same amount 
                                               
7
 In the theory section ride-hailing service includes taxis and cars driven by Uber and Lyft drivers. 
8
 A “real-world” trip can use multiple modes. For example, j could drive her car from her home to a ‘park and ride’ lot and 
then take commuter rail to finish her trip or she could use a ride-share service to go from her home to a light rail station 
and use the light rail to finish her trip.   
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of time in other circumstances. Defining a “delay multiplier” d > 1, we can write the individual’s (dis) 
value of time spent on a trip as, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1j j PTj PT j j RSj RSj j C Cj
PT RS C
m m m
v PT d a w PT RS d a w RS d a w
s s s
      
+ + + − + + + − + +                
 (3) 
 
where all time variables are measured in hours. Now individual j’s problem is to maximize 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
j j




v PT d a w PT RS d a w RS d a w
s s s
= −
      
+ + + − + + + − + +                
  (4) 
 
subject to equation (2). In equations (3)-(4), access and egress time is assumed to be the same for all 
individuals who use a car for their trip (there is no j subscript with aC). However, access and egress time 
for PT and ride hailing service is specific to j (aPTj and aRSj) given differences in bus or train stop 
proximity across the urban landscape and unequal spatial concentrations of ride hailing suppliers (e.g., 
there are many Uber drivers in Manhattan and Brooklyn but not as many on Long Island). Further, in 
equations (3)-(4) waiting time at a PT stop is not specific to a person but to the transportation system 
in the city, thus no j subscript on wPT. However, driving delay time (i.e., the difference between driving 
time in free-flow traffic and actual driving time) is specific to the location of j’s trip within a city, thus 
wRS and wC in (4) include the subscript j  (e.g., some places in a city are less congested than others). 
 Assume that PTj = 1 maximizes j’s utility subject to her budget constraint. For this to be the 
case, both of the following two inequalities must hold for individual j, 
 
( ) ( )
Delay time cost of PT relative to RS
Travel time cost ofBenefit of PT
PT relative to RSrelative to RS
RS PT
PTj RSj PT RSj
j PT RS
m p p m m
d a a w w
v s s
−
≥ − + − + −


     (5) 
 
( ) ( )
Delay time cost of PT relative to C
Travel time cost ofBenefit of PT
PT relative to Crelative to C
C PT
PTj C PT Cj
j PT C
m P P m m
d a a w w
v s s
−
≥ − + − + −


     (6) 
  












, measure j’s additional cost from 
using a ride-hailing service  or her own car, respectively, instead of PT (division by vj means that the 
additional cost is measured in hours instead of dollars). We can also interpret this as the benefit of 
using PT in lieu of the other options (an avoided cost). The right-hand terms of (5) and (6) measure the 
additional “effective” hours of transportation time j incurs from choosing to use PT over each of the 
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other two modes of transportation. Therefore, as long as the avoided cost of using PT in lieu of the 
other two modes (the left-hand side of equations (5) and (6)) is greater than the additional “effective” 
hours of transportation time j incurs by using PT instead of the other modes (the cost of PT use), then j 
will choose PT. 
 If we re-arrange (5) and (6) such that the terms that vary across individuals fall on the left-hand 
side of the inequalities we have,  
 
( ) ( )RS PTPTj RSj RSj PT
j RS PT
m p p m m
d a a w dw
v s s
−
− − − ≤ − −      (7) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )C PTPTj Cj PT C
j C PT
m p p m m
d a w d w a
v s s
−
− − ≤ − − −      (8) 
 
At any point in time, those individuals j with lower opportunity cost of time (low v), low access and 
egress time to PT (low aPT), relatively high access and egress time to RS (high aRS), and needing to make 
a trip across a congested area of the city (high wC and wRS) are the most likely to choose PT for their 
trip, all else equal. 
 Changes in transportation prices, transportation infrastructure, and transportation options will 
also change the likelihood of PT use for a trip by j at any point in time. Generally, as the monetary and 
time costs of using PT falls for j relative to the other two modes, the more likely she is to use PT for her 
trips. Specifically, if the ratios pPT / pC, PFT / PRS, /PTj RSja a , /PTj Ca a , or /PTj jw w  decrease then 
individual j’s likelihood of using PT for any given trip increases.  
 In this paper we estimate the impact that the entrance of the ride hailing service companies, 
Uber and Lyft, have had on PT use across the US’s largest cities. Entrance of ride-hailing service 
companies will affect the terms in equations (6) and (7) in several ways. First, their entrance has 
lowered aRS for many people across US cities. For example, Rayle et al. (2014) found that in San 
Francisco wait times for UberX cars were shorter than those for taxis. 9 Further, the entrance of Uber 
and Lyft has led to improvements in taxi service in several cities (Wallsten 2015). Second, in most cities 
Uber and Lyft have charged less per unit distance travelled than taxis (Silverstein 2014), although there 
are exceptions (e.g., Salnikov et al. 2015). Therefore, the advent of Uber and Lyft has tended to lower 
average pRS for many people across the US.
10,11 All else equal, decreases in aRS and pRS in an urban 
area’s ride hailing market should make individuals less likely to use PT for any given trip, thereby 
reducing overall PT use in the urban area. 
Just as the entry of Uber and Lyft has incentivized taxicab companies to improve their service, 
we suspect that intense competition between Uber and Lyft has lowered aRS and PRS even more over 
time in most major US cities. Up to this point in time Uber and Lyft have tended to stagger their entry 
                                               
9
 Uber has several different types of services. UberX is Uber’s low cost service. 
10
 During Uber’s infamous surge pricing periods, average PRS will have increased.  
11
 There is some evidence that Uber and Lyft are becoming consistently cheaper than taxis in many US cities. For example 
see http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/31/whats-cheaper-in-your-city-cabs-or-ride-shares.html.  
 5 
 
into cities, where, at least in the bigger US cities, Uber has almost always been the leader and Lyft the 
follower (Figure 1). We would not be surprised to find that the second entrant and the accompanying 
advertising and promotion campaigns and driver recruitment has spurred even greater reductions in 
aRS and PRS, thereby further reducing overall PT use in cities. 
In our theoretical model, it is clear that advent of Uber and Lyft will reduce PT use; that Uber 
and Lyft are substitutes for PT use. However, what if we relaxed the constraint on multi-modal trips in 
our model? In this more expansive interpretation of behavior, Uber and Lyft are conveyances that 
lower PT’s access and egress time (an input to PT use), and the ride-hailing services can now become 
complements to PT use. Specifically, Uber and Lyft can make using PT as the primary mode of a trip 
more likely, all else equal, by lowering PT egress time (lowering aPT).
12 If this ride hailing and PT use 
complementarity effect is strong enough then it is possible that the entry of Uber and Lyft has actually 
increased PT use despite the decreases in aRS and pRS (and the small increase in pPT use as we have to 
add the price of using Uber or Lyft for a “one mile” trip to a subway or bus stop).  
Our simple model and the one mode constraint masks another way that enhanced ride-hailing 
services and PT use can be complementary: Uber has claimed that its presence in a city makes it more 
convenient for individuals to use a combination of PT and Uber in lieu of their car for trips.  For 
example, Uber has pointed out that in Chicago, because “riders can always be confident of a ride back, 
Uber also removes the worry over whether transit services will be reliable or operating late at night, 
encouraging more people to use Chicago Transit Authority trains and buses, Metra commuter rail, and 
other public transit when they head out for a night on the town” (p. 27, Uber 2015). Again, if all of 
these ride hailing and PT complementarity effects are strong enough, it could be that the entry of Uber 
and Lyft has increased PT use despite the decreases in aRS and PRS.      
 
3. Data and Empirical Framework 
We use PT ridership data from the largest US urban areas with a discontinuity regression model 
design to test whether the entry of Uber and Lyft, typically staggered by several months, has been 
associated with an increase or decrease in PT use. Our regression model includes proxies for most of 
the factors that affect mode choice as given in equations (5)-(8). Ex ante we expect to find that the 
entry of these services has decreased PT ridership because of entry’s downward pressure on aRS and 
PRS.   
  
3.1. Data 
Monthly PT ridership data at the urbanized area (UZA) level is provided by the Federal Transit 
Authority (FTA) (https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/ntd-data). The FTA measures PT usage with monthly 
“unlinked passenger trips” (UPTs). UPT, given by UPTum where u indexes UZA and m months, measures 
                                               
12
 In fact some local governments have subsidized Uber to solve the last mile problem, meaning PPT will not increase for the 
user. For example, “Pinellas County in the Tampa Bay area just started a pilot program that pays up to $3 per trip to riders 
who take Ubers or taxis to bus stops.” Other public transportation systems have made the last mile problem easier to solve 
by coordinating their systems’ and Uber’s apps. (http://wastefraudandabuse.org/regulating-uber-subsidizing/)  
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the number of passenger trips across all of u’s  PT vehicles in month m.13 Unlinked means that every 
boarding increases UPT by one even if one person-trip is responsible for multiple boardings. For 
example, if a person rides a bus and then immediately transfers to the subway to complete her trip 
then UPTum count has increased by two, not one.
14 Over the course of the year, UPT in a UZA can swing 
dramatically. Typically, UPT is lowest in the winter months and greatest in the spring and fall. These 
seasonal gyrations can be seen in Figure 2, where we graph monthly UPT for the four largest US UZAs. 
The graphs also indicate the month that Uber and Lyft entered the respective market.   
In the theoretical model, prices for each mode are measured per unit distance. The price data 
we use in this analysis is a bit different. First, pPTum measures price per UPT in UZA u in month m. 
Ideally, we would calculate pPTum by dividing UZA u’s fare revenue in month m by u’s UPT in month m. 
Unfortunately, fare revenue is only reported by the FTA on an annual basis. Therefore, we divide u’s 
annual fare revenue (Figure 3) by u’s annual UPT and set pPTum equal to this number for each month m 
in that calendar year.15 Second, pCum, theoretically the per mile cost of using a car, is measured here 
with the real average price of a gallon of gas in UZA u in month m. When possible, we used monthly 
gas price data specific to the metropolitan statistical area in which the UZA is located16, otherwise we 
use the UZA’s state or region price datasets.17 Finally, we do not have data on pRSum. However, we do 
know the month that Uber and Lyft entered each UZA u.18 We assume each successive entry places 
sustained downward pressure on pRSum. According to equations (5)-(8), an increase in pPTum / pCum 
makes PT use less likely. Therefore, we expect to find that UPTum decreases in pPTum but increases in 
pCum, all else equal. 
We do not have the data to measure PT egress (aPTum) directly. However, we believe the 
variable per capita mileage of PT in u in month m, given by Mileum, is an indirect measure of aPTum. We 
surmise that as Mileum increases, more and more citizens of u will have better access to the system and 
aPTum decreases for more and more people. According to equations (5)-(8), an increase in aPTum makes 
PT use more likely. Therefore, all else equal, we expect to find that UPTum increases in Mileum. We 
calculated Mileum by dividing a UZA u’s sum of year t’s rail and non-rail public transposition miles (as 
                                               
13
 The FTA mandates that agencies submit a 100% count of UPTs, yet some agencies do not have the technology to meet 
this requirement. In this case, they are exempt and may report based on a sample, but the FTA does not keep track of the 
methods used by each agency. Due to this limitation, the UPTs may not be accurate when the sampling method is used.  
14
 We include almost all modes of public transportation in UPTum. The one exception is “Ferry Boat.” The different modes 
reported to the FTA are outlined in Supplementary Information Table A. 
15
 pPTum does not measure the amount a person pays to use public transportation as many commuters spread their public 
transportation “entry fee” over multiple trips. 
16
 See the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ website 
https://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/data/averageenergyprices_selectedareas_table.htm for specific metropolitan area 
gasoline prices. The BLS has metropolitan level data for Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, 
Miami, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.  
17
 See the US Energy Information Administration’s website 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_a_epmr_pte_dpgal_m.htm for state and regional level monthly gasoline prices. 
18
 See appendix for sources. 
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reported to the FTA) by the UZA u’s population in year t19 and then assigning the annul number to each 
month in year t.20   
We do not have data proxies for wait time by mode choice (wPT, wRS, and wC). However, our 
UZA dummies will control for the relative degree of congestion on the roads (wRS and wC) and the 
frequency of buses and trains (wPT) across UZAs. Our UZA dummies also control for the extent and 
scope of taxi cab service, the original but less convenient and flexible ride-hailing service, in a city. The 
continued tight regulation of the taxi industry across US cities, including limits on entry and fare 
ceilings (Teal and Berglund 1987, Cairns and Liston-Heyes 1996), means the service has remained 
rather static over the years in US cities and thus treating it as a fixed effect unique to each city is 
proper (e.g., the taxi industry is regulated differently in New York City than Minneapolis).  We also 
include seasonal dummies to control for a UZA’s seasonal variation in PT use. The seasonal dummies 
control for the impact that weather can have on modal egress, access, and wait times and overall 
demand for trips (Stover and McCormack 2012). We also include UZA’s monthly unemployment rates 
in the regression model, given by unempum. Monthly unemployment rates control for the impact of 
general economic conditions and the price sensitivity of a city’s populous on overall demand for trips 
(Buehler and Pucher 2012). Monthly unemployment data for each UZA comes from the unadjusted 
Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) series at the Bureau of Labor Statistics.21 
The UZAs we use are mostly drawn from the list of the US’ top 30 MSAs as measured by 2010 
population, but there are a few exceptions. Cities where Uber or Lyft entered after July 2014 were 
removed to ensure that all cities had at least two years of accurate UPT counts post-second entry. This 
meant dropping data from Washington, DC, Philadelphia, and Honolulu from our dataset. Moreover, 
San Francisco and Oakland share a UZA. Therefore, UPT counts for each city cannot be separated (and 
we cannot treat the UZA as one entity in our empirical model because each ride-hailing company 
entered these two cities at different times). So we drop the San Francisco-Oakland UZA from our 
database. In the end we have a database with 28 cities. See SI Table Y for the list of cities in our 
database and the dates of Uber and Lyft entry. 
  
3.2 Regression Discontinuity Design 
The simplest sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design we use is, 
 
 =  + 	
 + 	 + 
 −
 +  − + β +   (9) 
 
where m indicates months, 
 is the month that the first ride-share company entered UZA u,  
is the month that the second ride-share company entered UZA u, and  
                                               
19
 Annual population data by UZA comes from the American Community Survey. We used ACS 1-year estimates. 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml 
20
 In some cases, a UZA did not report mileage in a given year. If mileage was unreported for year t we estimated it by 
averaging the mileage in prior and subsequent years (t – 1 and t + 1 years, respectively). 
21
 BLS data is reported at the core-based statistical area (CBSA) level. UZA and CBSA do not align perfectly. The Los Angeles-
Long Beach-Anaheim, CA UZA was the most incongruent, with only 95% of the 2010 census population of the UZA inside 
the relevant CBSA. Given that the economic health of a city shouldn’t differ drastically across a CBSA border, the cities with 
UZAs that extend past the CBSA area are still be included in the model but are similar enough so that we do not have to 








           (10) 
 
  = 1, if  ≥ 0, if	 <          (11) 
 
For example, suppose Uber entered UZA u in May of 2012. In this case, 
 −
 = 0 and  = 1 
for m = May, 2012, 
 −
 = 1 and  = 1 for m = June, 2012, etc. In the opposite direction, 

 −
 = −1 and  = 0 for m = April, 2012, 
 −
 = −2 and  = 0 for m = March, 
2012, etc. The terms  −  and  are evaluated in the same manner but based on the month 
the second ride-share company enters.22 Further, in the simplest sharp regression discontinuity design 
 includes UZA and seasonal dummies and monthly unadjusted unemployment rates. The 
coefficients 	
  and 	  indicate the effect of the first and second entrants, respectively, on PT use in the 
representative UZA while 	
 + 	 indicates the joint effect of both entries. The coefficients  and  
measure the impact of the change in running time, pre- and post-treatment, on PT usage.  
 We also estimate a RD model with more functional flexibility and a wider set of variables in 
, 
 
 =  + 	
















+. − + .! −!-"#############$#############%
&'(	)*	!
+ β +       (12) 
 
The addition of the terms 
 −
! and  −! means that change in running time, pre- 
and post- treatment, can have a non-linear impact on UPTum. Further, multiplying change in running 
time and its square by the treatment effects means that running time can have a different impact on 
UPTum before treatment than after treatment. For example, entry of a ride-hailing service in a UZA may 
initially have little impact on transportation choices in the UZA due to consumer unfamiliarity with 
these services and a limited supply of drivers. Only after several months of advertising and outreach 
will people seriously begin considering the ride-hailing service as a viable transportation alternative. 
Further, only after several months of operation will there be enough drivers to support rising demand 
for these services. 







!       (13) 
 
                                               
22
 In Pittsburgh Lyft entered prior to Uber. In all other UZAs we study Uber entered first or they entered simultaneously. The 
companies entered simultaneously in Austin, Charlotte, Houston, and Nashville. 
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indicates the effect of the first entrant on PT use with 	
  expressing the instantaneous size of the 
discontinuity and , and ,! revealing the momentum effects of the first entrant on PT. Further, in the 
expanded model (12) the term, 
 
	 + . − + .! −!        (14) 
 
indicates the effect of the second entrant on PT use in model (12) with 	  expressing the size of the 
discontinuity at the cut-off and . and .! revealing the momentum effects of the second entrant on 
PT. Further, the joint effect of both entries in the expanded model is given by the sum of (13) and (14). 
Finally, the variables in  now include pPTum , pCum, and Mileum as well as those variables in model 
(9)’s version of .   
We use an RD bandwidth of 36 months centered on the timing of the first entrant (all UZAs had 
the second rise-share company enter within 36 months of the first). In some cases a UZA in our dataset 
may not have 36 months of post-first entry data but all UZAs have 36 months of pre-first entry data. 
The shortage of post-first entry observations is more pronounced in the estimate of model (M2). PT 
mileage has not been reported for 2015 and 2016 and fare revenue data has not been reported for 
2016. In contrast, the data used to estimate model (9) are through October, 2016. 
 
4. Results 
The estimates of models (9) and (12) when UPTum is measured in 10,000s of monthly passenger 
trips across all PT vehicles are given in Table 1. In both estimates, the first ride-hailing company entrant 
causes an instantaneous jump in monthly PT use, all else equal.  Specifically, an additional 1,249,100 
monthly rides in the estimate of model (9) (i.e., 	/
 = 124.91 is significant at a p = 0.01 level) and an 
additional 1,092,600 monthly rides in the estimate of model (12) (	/
 = 109.26 is significant at a p = 
0.1 level). In model (12), the impact of time on UPTum 1) can be different prior to and after ride-hailing 
company entry and 2) is assumed to be non-linear. In the estimate of this more elaborate model, 
UPTum accelerates over time after first entry, albeit in a statistically insignificant manner (i.e., the first 




! with respect to 
 are positive).   
Conversely, the second entrant causes an instantaneous decrease in PT use, all else equal. 
Specifically, 1,601,100 monthly rides in the estimate of model (9) (	/ = −160.11 is significant at a p = 
0.01 level) and 92,850 monthly rides in the estimate of model (12) (	/ = −95.58). While 	/  itself is not 
statistically significant, the total effect of second entry, given by equation (14), is negative and 
statistically significant at the p = 0.01 levels when  − equals 12, 24, and 36. In other words, 
the second entry progressively dampens UPTum, all else equal, as time progresses. Therefore, on 
average, the second entrant mitigated the positive or complementary impact the first entrant had on 
PT use across the 30 largest US UZAs. 
To determine if the second entrant completely reversed the gains in PT use associated with the 
advent of the first entrant we estimate the joint impact of Uber and Lyft entry on UPTum.  Specifically, 
	/







! + 	/  








 = 12 and  − = 0      (16) 

 −
 = 24 and  − = 12      (17) 

 −
 = 36 and  − = 24      (18) 
 
indicates that the second entrant more than counters the positive impact the first entrant had on PT 
use; in fact, the negative impact of the second entrant on subsequent PT use overwhelms the positive 
impact of the first entrant on PT use. Furthermore, the joint impact of entry on PT use becomes 
increasingly negative over time (although none of these joint impact variables are statistically 
significant).   
What story do the estimates of models (9) and (12) tell, at least across the US’s largest UZAs? 
First, the positive impact of first entry on UPT in estimates of both models (i.e., 	/
 > 0) suggests that 
customers generally treated first entrants as conveyances that lowed PT’s access and egress time. In 
other words, initial ride-share company entry complemented PT usage). It could be that ride-hailing 
use after first entry was driven by two types of passengers: 1) people who would have otherwise taken 
their personal car on a trip now took the trip by Uber (or Lyft in the one case where it was first) and 2) 
people who used Uber to get to PT stops and had previously not done so due to the “last mile 
problem” or a late night trip segment.23 In other words, first entry decreased aPTum enough that a 
significant number of people chose PT as their primary (or at least co-equal) mode of trip 
transportation. However, the second entrant appears to have eliminated this trend.  While aPTum likely 
falls even more with the second entrant, we suspect that the competition between Uber and Lyft 
drove the price of ride-hailing (pRSum) and ride-hailing egress (aRSum) low enough so that more and more 
people choose to take their entire trip with a ride-hailing company instead of using ride-hailing as a 
convenient access to PT. 
Our first set of results does not distinguish UPT by PT mode. However, UPTum can be broken 
down by transportation mode (Table 2). Therefore, we re-estimate models (9) and (12) using bus UPT 
only24 and then again using rail UPT only.25 In each variation on the original model we construct pPTum 
and Mileum variables that only include the relevant PT modes. Given, 
 
• that the type of people who have access to and use light rail – commuter rail tend to be 
socioeconomically different than the people who have access to and use busses (Garrett and 
Taylor 1999, Hess 2012, Walker 2014), 
                                               
23
 In addition, some UZAs are using Uber and Lyft to provide paratransit. See “Boston MBTA Teams Up With Uber, Lyft 
Paratransit Pilot” http://www.metro.us/boston/mbta-teams-up-with-uber-lyft-for-paratransit-pilot-to-make-
transportation-more-accessible/zsJpip---N44dzCbCPRls6/ and “Uber Now Offers Assitance for Elderly and Disabled” 
http://lifehacker.com/uber-now-offers-assistance-for-elderly-and-disabled-peo-1718398360. However, the number of 
paratranist UPTs in UPTum are too small to make a statistical difference in our model.   
24
 Transportation category modes CB, MB, RB, and TB in Supplementary Information Table A.  
25
 Transportation category modes CR, HR, LR, MG, MO, SR and YR in Supplementary Information Table A. 
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• that people perceive qualitative differences between PT trips completed by rail versus bus 
(Ben-Akiva and Morikawa 2002, Cantwell et al. 2009, Scherer 2010, Scherer and Dziekan 2012); 
and 
• that these modes are often marketed differently (Garrett and Taylor 1999, Scherer 2010) 
 
we would not be surprised to find that the impact of ride hailing company entry on PT use will differ by 
mode.   
The estimate of model (9) when UPTum only includes rail passenger trips is similar to the estimate 
of model (9) when UPTum includes all modes; compare columns (1) in Tables 1 and 3. The first entrant is 
associated with an immediate increase in rail UPT, all else equal, and the second entrant is associated 
with an immediate decrease in rail UPT, all else equal.  Further, the joint impact of ride-hailing entry on 
rail UPT is net negative. The estimate of (12) with rail-only UPT also looks similar to the estimate of (12) 
with total UPT. Compare columns (2) in Tables 1 and 3. 
However, the estimate of model (9) when UPTum only includes bus passenger trips is dissimilar to 
the estimate of model (9) when UPTum is made up of all modes; compare column (1) in Table 1 to 
column (3) in Table 3. In the bus-only UPT case, the first and second entrant are both associated with a 
boost in subsequent bus use and the joint effect (	/
 + 	/ > 0) is significant at a p = 0.05 level.  
However, the estimate of model (12) with bus-only UPT is fairly similar to the estimate of (12) with 
total UPT; compare column (2) in Table 1 to column (4) in Table 3.  All in all, it appears that the 
decreases in ride-hailing price (pRSum) and egress (aRSum) due to ride-hailing company competition had a 
more negative impact on rail trip use than it did on bus trip use. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
Our identification of the impacts of ride-hailing company entry on PT use could be biased if the 
order of company entry into cities was determined by public transportation considerations. For 
example, if Uber and Lyft targeted cities with the largest PT networks for entry first and then moved 
onto cities with smaller networks then the pattern of entry would not necessarily be exogenous to its 
impact on PT use. 
 To that end we plot order of entry into a UZA (by the first entrant only) against UZA population 
in the year of entry, annual UZA PT trips in the year prior to entry, UZA PT mileage in the year of entry, 
annual UZA PT trips per capita in the year prior to entry, and UZA PT mileage per capita in the year of 
entry (Figure 4). First we see that the New York UZA, one of the first UZAs that Uber entered, is so 
much larger in every dimension than the other UZAs. If we ignore the New York UZA no obvious 
pattern between order of entry and PT variables. For example, it does not appear that a linear line with 
a negative or positive slope would provide a good fit for any of the plots in Figure 4. In other words, 
other than the obvious decision to enter America’s premier city first, there is not obvious evidence that 
Uber and Lyft targeted UZA entry order according to the size of PT networks.      
  
6. Conclusion 
The results of our analysis indicate that the entrance of the first ride-hailing company served as 
a complement to public transportation use, at least across the UZAs included in our database. 
However, after the entry of the second ride-hailing company, public transportation usage decreased in 
our studied UZAs to levels either at or below those recorded prior to first entry. Therefore, the joint 
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presence of the two major private ride-hailing services transformed ride-hailing services from a public 
transportation complement to a public transportation substitute, at least in the studied UZAs. In 
addition, we found that this substitution effect strengthened over time. While our model does not 
explain why joint presence transformed ride-hailing from a complementary to a substitute good for 
public transportation, we offer some educated guesses for the switch. First, we speculate that after 
both ride-hailing companies entered the market, competition for market-share led both companies to 
reduce prices to the point that many people in the studied UZAs were incentivized to use the ride-
hailing services exclusively in lieu of public transportation. Second, we speculate that using ride-hailing 
services in lieu of public transportation became easier and more convenient over time as Uber and Lyft 
built up their stock of drivers in the studies UZAs, thereby reducing ride-hailing service wait and egress 
time.  
While we cannot prove that price competition caused ride-hailing services and public 
transportation to become substitute we do have evidence that Uber and Lyft regularly engage in price 
competition to win market share. For example, in January 2014, Uber announced it was both 
introducing UberX, their most affordable service, into more cities and cutting prices of the existing 
UberX service in other cities.26 In January 2015, Uber made another announcement that they would be 
dropping prices again in 48 cities around the US as part of a “Beating the Winter Slump” campaign to 
encourage ridership.27 In January 2016, Uber indicated that they would be cutting prices a third time in 
100 cities around the US and Canada. Los Angeles and San Francisco saw fares cut by 10%, while other 
cities such as Houston and Richmond, Virginia saw even larger decreases.28 Lyft has also been 
aggressive about cutting prices. For example, in 2016 Lyft dropped fares in 48 cities. 29,30 Lyft has 
continued to lower prices in 2017 while Uber hasn’t.  Specifically, in January, 2017, Lyft lowered prices 
in 42 cities around the US.31 Lyft may have felt compelled to unilaterally lower prices given Uber’s 
continued market share dominance over Lyft. For example, in 2016 Lyft generated 163 million trips 
across the US while Uber generated 78 million trips across the US in December, 2016 alone. All in all, 
this evidence of price competition between Uber and Lyft supports our speculative notion that 
duopolistic competition between the two companies has  helped convert ride-hailing service from a 
public transportation complement to a public transportation substitute.  
 Our results also suggest that ride-hailing service entry affected the behavior of bus riders 
differently than it did rail riders. In some cities there is no rail public transportation option. However, 
for the cities that have both modes, the difference in usage response to ride-hailing entry is a topic 
worth exploring further.  In our model estimates, ride-hailing services never became a substitute for 
bus use. If anything, the two transportation types displayed a complementary relationship.   One 
theory: the typical bus rider is poorer than the typical rail rider and ride-hailing prices are still much 

















higher than the typical bus rider’s reservation price for ride-hailing services. Conversely, for richer rail 
users, their reservation price for ride-hailing services is much higher. Thus, price competition among 
Uber and Lyft make it much more likely that the typical rail user will use a ride-hailing service than a 
typical bus user. Further, rail public transportation fares are generally higher than fares for bus public 
transportation. For example, in our database the average fare per rail UPT is $1.36 and the average 
fare per bus UPT is $0.88. For many rail users the difference in rail fare and the ride-hailing fares, 
driven low by oligopoly competition, could be low enough to entice a substitution to ride-hailing 
services. However, for bus users the difference in bus fare and the ride-hailing fares may be still too 
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Figure 1: Density of months between first and second ride-hailing company entry across 28 major US 






Figure 2: Monthly Unlinked Passenger Trips (UPTs) in the four largest US Urbanized Areas (UZAs) and 
the Dates of Uber and Lyft Entry into the Ride Hailing Market (indicated by red dot and red dotted 
line). The official names of the UZAs are New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT; Los Angeles-Long Beach-






Figure 3: Annual public transportation fare revenue in the four largest US Urbanized Areas (UZAs). All 
dollars are nominal. The official names of the UZAs are New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT; Los Angeles-Long 







Figure 4: Order of ride-hailing private company entry into a UZA (in ascending order on the x-axis) 
against (A) UZA population in year of entry, (B) annual UZA UPT in year prior to entry, (C) UZA PT 
total miles in year of entry, (D) annual UZA UPT per capita in year prior to entry, and (E) UZA PT total 




Table 1: Explaining total monthly unlinked passenger trips in an urbanized area 
Model Specification (1) (2) 





First entrant treatment - 12 months since entry  27.24   
(129.98) 
First entrant treatment - 24 months since entry  136.18  
(259.59) 
First entrant treatment - 36 months since entry  436.10   
(442.00) 
   
Second entrant treatment (	) -160.11*** 
(35.12) 
-92.85   
(62.68) 
Second entrant treatment - 12 months since entry  -324.64*** 
(93.68) 
Second entrant treatment - 24 months since entry  -945.95*** 
(284.41) 
Second entrant treatment - 36 months since entry  -1956.8*** 
(751.99) 
   
Total Treatment (	
 + 	) -35.20 
(41.73) 
 
Total treatment - 12 months since first entry, 0 months since 
second entry  
 -65.62   
(132.02) 
Total treatment - 24 months since first entry, 12 months 
since second entry 
 -188.46  
(241.34) 
Total treatment - 36 months since first entry, 24 months 
since second entry 
 -509.85  
(448.38) 
   
Price of gasoline (PCum) 
 
-47.86   
(38.99) 









  Unemployment Y Y 
Seasonal dummies Y Y 
Urbanized area dummies Y Y 
N 1798 1465 
Notes: Dependent variable is then number of 10,000 unlinked passenger trips in month m in UZA u. Column (1) is an 
estimate of model (M1). Column (2) is an estimate of model (M2). Standard errors are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 





Table 2: Share of UPT by Rail and Bus 
UZA Rail Bus 
Atlanta 0.511 0.489 
Austin 0.022 0.978 
Baltimore 0.277 0.723 
Boston 0.684 0.316 
Charlotte 0.185 0.815 
Chicago 0.467 0.533 
Columbus 0.000 1.000 
Dallas 0.400 0.600 
Denver 0.228 0.772 
Detroit 0.040 0.960 
Houston 0.167 0.833 
Indianapolis 0.000 1.000 
Jacksonville 0.076 0.924 
Los Angeles 0.177 0.823 
Milwaukee 0.000 1.000 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 0.147 0.853 
Nashville 0.027 0.973 
New York 0.703 0.297 
Oklahoma City 0.000 1.000 
Philadelphia 0.485 0.515 
Phoenix 0.194 0.806 
Pittsburgh 0.123 0.877 
Providence 0.000 1.000 
Sacramento 0.429 0.571 
San Diego 0.390 0.610 
Seattle 0.081 0.919 
Honolulu 0.000 1.000 




Table 3: Explaining monthly unlinked passenger trips by rail and bus in a urban area   
 Rail UPT only Bus UPT only 
Model Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















     




















     
Total Treatment (	





Total treatment - 12 months since first entry, 0 months 
since second entry 
 -141.12  
(127.63) 
 37.08  
(47.62) 
Total treatment - 24 months since first entry, 12 months 
since second entry 
 -315.15  
(236.79) 
 50.13  
(87.07) 
Total treatment - 36 months since first entry, 24 months 
since second entry 
 -541.14  
(431.97) 
 -35.1  
(161.74) 
     








Rail or Non-Rail mileage per capita (Mileum)  744113.4  
(2627639) 





Unemployment Y Y Y Y 
Seasonal dummies Y Y Y Y 
Urbanized area dummies Y Y Y Y 
N 1405 1153 1798 1465 
Notes: Dependent variable is then number of 10,000 unlinked passenger trips in month m in UZA u on buses only or trains 
only. Columns (1) and (3) are estimates of model (M1). Columns (2) and (4) are estimates of model (M2). Standard errors 
are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  







SI File A 
Certain changes in best-practices of public transportation data collection may impact the 
results. In January 2012, certain UZA-level agencies shifted from reporting UPT on a monthly basis to 
an annual basis. These agencies are known as “reduced reporters.” During the year FTA calculates 
monthly UPT for reduced reporters by dividing the ridership figures reported for the previous annual 
report year by 12. UPT figures for reduced reporters are than corrected once the agency submits data 
at the end of the year. Therefore, reduced reporting only affects our 2016 UPT data. Further, our UPT 
numbers for UZA u in month m are the sum of all agency UPTs for that month.  Agencies are eligible for 
reduced reporting only if they have thirty or fewer vehicles. In most UZA any reduced reporter 
contributes a minimal amount to the UZA’s monthly UPT.  Therefore, whatever measurement error 
reduced reporting adds to 2016 UPTum data will not substantially affect our results.  
For the data and code used to estimate the regression models see 
http://www.bowdoin.edu/faculty/enelson/research-data-files/UberLyftData.zip 
 
SI Table A: Public Transportation by Mode 
Abbreviation Mode of Service 
AG Automated Guideway 
CB Commuter Bus 
CC Cable Car 
CR Commuter Rail 
DR Demand Responsive Paratransit 
DT Demand Responsive Paratransit - Taxi 
HR Heavy Rail 
IP Inclined Plane 
LR Light Rail 
MB Bus 
MG Monorail/Automated Guideway 
MO Monorail 
RB Bus Rapid Transit 
SR Streetcar Rail 
TB Trolleybus 
VP Van Pool 








SI Table B: The date of the first and second ride-hailing company across the 28 UZAs considered in 
this study. See SI Table C for the sources of this entry data. 
Official UZA name Short hand for UZA 
First Entry  Second Entry 
Month Year Month Year 
Atlanta, GA Atlanta 8 2012 8 2013 
Austin, TX Austin 6 2014 6 2014 
Baltimore, MD Baltimore 1 2013 10 2013 
Boston, MA--NH--RI Boston 10 2011 5 2013 
Charlotte, NC--SC Charlotte 9 2013 9 2013 
Chicago, IL--IN Chicago 9 2011 5 2013 
Columbus, OH Columbus 12 2013 2 2014 
Dallas--Fort Worth--Arlington, TX Dallas 9 2012 10 2013 
Denver--Aurora, CO Denver 9 2012 9 2013 
Detroit, MI Detroit 3 2013 4 2014 
Houston, TX Houston 2 2014 2 2014 
Indianapolis, IN Indianapolis 6 2013 8 2013 
Jacksonville, FL Jacksonville 12 2013 4 2014 
Los Angeles--Long Beach--Santa Ana, CA Los Angeles 3 2012 2 2013 
Milwaukee, WI Milwaukee 3 2014 4 2014 
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN Minneapolis-St Paul 10 2012 8 2013 
Nashville-Davidson, TN Nashville 12 2013 12 2013 
New York--Newark, NY--NJ--CT New York 5 2011 7 2014 
Oklahoma City, OK Oklahoma City 10 2013 4 2014 
Philadelphia, PA--NJ--DE--MD Philadelphia* 6 2012 2 2015 
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ Phoenix 11 2012 9 2013 
Pittsburgh, PA Pittsburgh 2 2014 3 2014 
Providence, RI--MA Providence 9 2013 3 2014 
Sacramento, CA Sacramento 1 2013 11 2013 
San Diego, CA San Diego 6 2012 7 2013 
Seattle, WA Seattle 8 2011 4 2013 
Honolulu, HI Honolulu* 8 2013 6 2015 
Washington, DC--VA--MD Washington, DC* 12 2011 11 2015 
Notes: Dropped from regression analysis due to insufficient UPT data post-second entry. In every case besides Pittsburgh 





SI Table C: List of websites that provided date of entry into each UZA in SI Table B 







































































































































Washington, DC DC http://www.greencarreports.com/news/10
77654_uber-app-to-connect-riders-and-
drivers-now-legal-in-d-c-at-last 
http//blog.lyft.com/posts/dc-lyft-
line?rq=launch 
 
 
